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ARTICLE
SOME THOUGHTS ON THE NORTH





In light of two recent global political phenomena, this
Article will consider the contribution of environmental protec-
tion to social stability. The first event was the election of
Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Le6n as President of Mexico' on Au-
gust 21, 1993. Mr. Zedillo's election caused many to breathe a
sigh of relief, not the least of whom were the many Wall Street
investors' worried about the stability of new United States
investment in Mexico' since the North American Free Trade
* Instructor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I would like to thank Caroline
Holland, a third-year student at Brooklyn Law School, for her very able research
assistance. Elizabeth Umlas provided invaluable substantive and editorial com-
ments. I would also like to thank Dean Joan Wexler and Brooklyn Law School for
their support. Work on this article was supported with a grant from the Brooklyn
Law School Faculty Fund.
1. While two of the state signatories to the North American Free Trade
Agreement are federated republics, namely the United States of America and the
United Mexican States, this Article will adopt the United States practice of refer-
ring to the United States of America as the U.S. and the United Mexican States
as Mexico.
2. See, e.g., Allen R. Myerson, Mexico Again Calls U.S. Investors, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 1994, at D2 ("United States corporations and investors are poised for a
new round of ventures in Mexico after the ruling party's recent victory in an elec-
tion they regarded as clean enough, at least, to be valid .... Plans for Mexican
investment [are] being pulled out of the drawers and off the shelves where they
have been put when the party, known as P.R.I., faltered early this year with the
peasant rebellion in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas and the assassination
of P.R.I.'s initial presidential candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio.").
3. For example, the new policy will open an annual $7.2 billion market, with
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Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect. They had good reason to
worry. On December 8, 1993, President Clinton signed
NAFTA.4 Three weeks later, on January 1, 1994, the Agree-
ment went into effect, and on that very day a group of armed
Indian peasants in the poor, southern Mexican state of
Chiapas staged an insurrection against the government of the
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).5 Among the reasons
for their revolt, the Chiapas rebels6 cited the passage of
NAFTA as a "'death sentence' for Indians, a gift to the rich
that will destroy the divide between narrowly concentrated
wealth and mass misery, destroying what remains of their
indigenous society."7 The rebels' violent insurrection began by
up to forty-nine percent comprised of money from foreign telecommunications firms
seeking places in the potentially lucrative Mexican market. See Mexico Prepares to
Open 7.2 Billion Telecommunication Market, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1100 (July
13, 1994). The easing of trade restrictions promised to make an already extensive
trading relationship between the U.S. and Mexico even stronger. Nearly three-
fifths of Mexico's foreign investment comes from U.S. companies; seventy percent
of Mexico's imports come from the U.S., and eighty-five percent of Mexico's exports
go to the U.S. See M. Delal Baer, North American Free Trade, 70 FOREIGN AFF.
132 (Fall 1991); Allen R. Myerson, U.S.-Mexico Trade Advances Sharply Under
New Accord, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1994, at Al.
Environmentally-related expenses are among the largest areas for potential
foreign investment, in the forms of development of pollution abatement and treat-
ment infrastructure. Both the U.S. and Canada possess expertise Mexico will re-
quire in areas such as site cleanup, waste water treatment and air emission con-
trol. Report Cites Market Opportunities Available to Canadian Industry in Mexico,
17 Int'l Env't. Rep. (BNA), No. 6 at 318 (April 6, 1994); see also Timothy Noah,
Cleaning Up: Environmental Companies Stand to Make a Bundle from the Trade
Pact, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1994, at R8.
4. Marc Sandalow, Clinton Signs NAFTA, Looks Ahead to GATT, S.F.
CHRON., Dec. 9, 1993, at A8.
5. Mexican Difficulties in 1994, 4 Mex. Trade & L. Rep. (Int'l Trade Info.
Corp.) No. 4 (Apr. 1, 1994), available in LEXIS, BUSFIN Library, MTLR File.
6. The rebels fashioned themselves the Zapatista National Liberation Army,
or "Zapatistas" for short, after the Mexican revolutionary hero, Emiliano Zapata.
Id.
7. Noam Chomsky, Time Bombs, IN THESE TIMES, Feb. 21, 1994, at 14 (add-
ing that "the Zapatista 'declaration of war' stated [that] [tihe struggle today is 'for
work, land, housing, food, health care, education, independence, freedom, democra-
cy, justice and peace.').
The Zapatista's "Declaration of War" stated six points. The first five related
to a plan of war, directing how it should be conducted, with particular attention
to the role of individual troops. The sixth point, however, must be read as a sub-
stantive demand. It ordered that the Mexican government "[sluspend the looting of
our natural resources in areas controlled by the [Zapatistas." See also Population
Urged to Overthrow 'Dictator,' THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 5, 1994, at 11; see Peasant
Guerilla Army in Chiapas State Declares War on Federal Government (BBC Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts, Jan. 3, 1994).
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taking hostage the seventy-year old former Governor of
Chiapas.8 The rebels agreed to a cease-fire on January 10, and
they eventually released the former governor. The rebels then
entered into peace negotiations with President Salinas' govern-
ment although the talks remain unresolved at this writing.9
The rebels subsequently promised to disrupt the August
1994 national elections.'0 In the end, the Chiapas rebels and
their defiant leader, known only as Subcommander Marcos,
presented no serious obstacle to the conduct of the election,
1
which was initially and primarily judged to be fair and without
the widespread voter fraud that characterized earlier elec-
tions. 2 As expected, the PRI's candidate, Mr. Zedillo, was cho-
sen by a comfortable margin to head the nation for the next six
years, as his party has done for the past sixty-five years. 3
President-elect Zedillo has promised that he will aim in
his tenure to conciliate differing political interests. 4 Never-
8. Id.
9. Anthony DePalma, Mexican's Offer to Rebels: Turn in Guns and He'll Quit,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1994, at A14. On the early phase of the rebellion, see Mexican
Rebels Free Ex-Governor, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 17, 1994, at 22. On the negotiations be-
tween the government and the rebels, see Tim Golden, Rebels in Mexico Spurn
Peace Plan From Government, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1994, at Al; Tim Golden,
Mexican Rebels Gather to Rule on Government's Peace Offer, N.Y. TIMES, June 1,
1994, at Al.
10. Ingrid Peritz, Hoping for a Fair Vote, GAZETTE (Montreal), Aug. 13, 1994,
at B2.
11. The rebels had promised to retaliate if the election results were fraudu-
lent, as was widely believed to have been the case in 1988. See Anthony DePalma,
Mexican Rebels Warn of Retaliation if Vote is Fixed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1994, at
As.
12. It was widely believed, for example, that the left-of-center opposition can-
didate, Cuauhtdmoc Cdrdenas, would have won the 1988 presidential election
against Carlos Salinas de Gotari had the computerized voting system not mysteri-
ously broken down in the middle of the election. See, e.g., Alan Riding, Letter
From Mexico: How Peasants Lit the Fires of Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1994,
at A5; Rdul M. Sanchez, Mexico's Governmental Human Rights Commissions: An
Ineffective Response to Widespread Human Rights Violations, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J.
1041, 1045 (1994).
However, in just over a month, reports of larger scale voter fraud began to
surface. See, e.g., Anthony DePalma, Mexican Election Loses Some Luster as Fraud
is Uncovered, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1994, at A12 (stating that results in at least
three states had been overturned due to fraud, and adding that "[c]onflict has
continued in Chiapas State in the south where the victory of the governing party
candidate for Governor has been accepted by state election officials but rejected by
opposition leaders, who maintain there was widespread fraud.").
13. John Bailey, Mexico's Moment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1994, at A23; Peritz,
supra note 10.
14. Tim Golden, Winner in Mexico Calls for "Dialogue" With Other Parties,
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theless, even after the election, the Chiapas rebels have yet to
discontinue their rebellion and to agree to a truce with the
government. 5 This fact, among others, has caused some ob-
servers to suggest that the relatively peaceful election may not
necessarily bring domestic tranquility.
6
The second political phenomenon prompting these reflec-
tions is really a series of events, first in the central African
nation of Rwanda and, more recently, in Cuba. The link be-
tween these two wildly disparate nations is, of course, the tide
of refugees, in the case of Rwanda, 7 escaping political tur-
moil, and in the case of Cuba," escaping long-endured politi-
cal repression and economic hardship. Although the circum-
stances that culminated in both of these tragic tides of refu-
gees are dissimilar, they nonetheless serve to remind us with
frightening force of the consequences of domestic unrest, not
only in these politically troubled nations, but also upon the
neighboring states and, indeed, entire regions.
The Cuban refugee problem, in which would-be emigres to
the U.S. embark on a dangerous journey on makeshift rafts
across the Florida straits, 9 is particularly alarming for people
in the United States. If Cuban leader Fidel Castro has his way,
the surge of refugees resettled in camps on the United States'
base at Guantanamo Bay will force the Administration to re-
evaluate its thirty-two year economic embargo of the socialist
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1994, at Al. But see Anthony DePalma, New President is
Snubbed by Opposition in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1994, at All.
15. See, e.g., DePalma, supra note 9; Gerardo Tena, Tension in Southern Mexi-
co as New Governor to be Sworn in, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 5, 1994, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
16. See, e.g., Dick J. Reavis, Mexico's Perilous Second Act, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
24, 1994, at A17 (suggesting that future political stability in Mexico depends upon
large numbers of people being brought back into the political mainstream after
decades of "electoral and political abuses," even at the risk of widespread social
unrest by radical revolutionary groups as happened in the United States' civil
rights movement following the assassination, in 1968, of the Reverend Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr.).
17. John-Thor Dahlburg, Rwandan Government Outraged Over Sluggish Pace
of Inquiry Into Genocide, LA. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1994, at A6; S. Frederick Starr, It's
Up to Us to Defuse the Rwandan Time Bomb, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 1994, at A17.
18. Mike Williams, Refugees at Our Doorstep: A Growing Reality, ATLANTA J.
& CONST., Aug. 19, 1994, at A10.
19. See, e.g., Maria Newman, Flight From Cuba: The Scene; and Still Cubans
Flee: 1,300 More Picked Up, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1994, at A10; Daniel Williams,
U.S., Cuba Interrupt Migration Discussion; Negotiator to Consult Castro on Limits
of Talks, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1994, at A32.
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island state."
The devastating effects of domestic disquiet underscore the
need to re-examine NAFTA. The Chiapas rebels' complaints
about NAFTA revived anxious discussions about the
Agreement's possibly destabilizing effects on Mexico, and par-
ticularly its effect on labor, as manufacturing, goods and ser-
vices move more freely between the United States, Mexico, and
Canada.2 However, although environmental concerns figured
prominently in the debates preceding NAFTA,22 they have
20. Steven Greenhouse, Flight From Cuba: In Washington, U.S. Rejects
Castro's Proposal for Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1994, at A12 (stating that Presi-
dent Clinton was resisting calls to engage in discussions with President Castro on
changes in the U.S.-Cuban trade embargo); see Cuba Allows Farmers Open Market
Selling; It is Another Step From Communism, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 18, 1994, at
A26 (referring to the 32-year duration of the embargo).
The United States and Cuba eventually reached a compromise that left the
embargo intact. Paul Lewis, Cuba Vows to End Exodus in Return for a Rise in
Visas, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 10, 1994, at Al; Stanley Meisler, Castro Lifts Key Obsta-
cle in U.S. Talks, L.A. TI .s, Sept. 4, 1994, at Al. However, many remained of
the opinion that the incident opened the way for future discussions. See, e.g., Ste-
ven Greenhouse, Critics Warn That Immigration Pact Leaves Many Cuban Issues
Unresolved, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1994, at A4.
21. See, e.g., Martin Assures House Panel That Labor Concerns Under NAFTA
Will Be Addressed 'Expeditiously,' Dally Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 180, at A-10 (Sept.
016, 1992). These particular debates were a central feature of the tumult in this
country surrounding passage of NAFTA, especially on the part of organized labor.
Labor groups feared that free trade would encourage businesses to move to Mexico
for lower environmental, wage and safety standards than those required in the
U.S., thus eliminating U.S. jobs. See generally The Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, Report on the North American Free Trade Agreement, (Oct. 28,
1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter Association Report]; Alan Reynolds,
NAFTA's Victory: The Future Triumphs over the Past, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Nov. 21, 1993, at G-1. Labor groups also argued that, in order to compete, facil-
ities in the U.S. would have to lower wages. Id. Conversely, supporters argued
that NAFTA would offset any loss of jobs through substantial increases in U.S.
exports and the creation of new jobs. Secretary of State Warren Christopher,
NAFTA: A Bridge to a Better Future for The United States and the Hemisphere,
Statement Before the Senate Finance Committee (Sept. 15, 1993), in DEV'T ST.
DISPATCH, Sept. 13, 1993, at 625.
22. See, e.g., Keith Schneider, Environment Groups Are Split on Support for
Free-Trade Pact, N.Y. TMIES, Sept. 16, 1993, at Al; Environmental Catastrophe,
Canada to Mexico: 8 Fatal Flaws of NAFTA, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1993 (full-page
advertisement by coalition of national environmental groups); Environmental Group
Coalition Issue Five Point Criticism of NAFTA, 10 INSIDE U.S. TRAfE (Inside
Wash. Publ., Davis, Polk, & Wardwell No. 35), Aug. 28, 1992 (detailing the criti-
cisms of NAFTA by 12 major environmental groups, including the Natural Re-
sources Defense Council and the Sierra Club); Response of Environmental and
Consumer Organizations to the September 6, 1992 Text of The North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Oct. 6, 1992) (outlining objections to NAFTA
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been strangely absent since the new concern about the
Agreement's implications in the wake of the Chiapas upris-
ing." This is particularly surprising in view of the fact that
the rebels' demands included controlling the invasion of foreign
capital and manufacturing facilities,2 as well as the urgent
need for land reform, issues that both have serious environ-
mental implications.
This Article will focus on NAFTA and NAFTA's supple-
mental environmental side agreement-the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (Supplemental
Agreement)25 -in light of recent events. In doing so, it will
suggest that recent events in Chiapas demand a re-evaluation
of NAFTA's environmental protections. This is not at all to
suggest that stronger environmental protection alone would
avert future Zapatista insurrections. The inequities of Mexican
land distribution and the poverty of southern Mexican states
such as Chiapas have historical roots that will hardly be recti-
fied by more vigorous enforcement of environmental laws.2"
draft by seventeen not-for-profit groups) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
23. One notable exception is June Nash, The Challenge of Trade Liberalization
to Cultural Survival on the Southern Frontier of Mexico, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 367, 370 (1994) (arguing, soon after NAFTA's passage, "that the most effec-
tive control over the predatory incursions of large, agro-industrial enterprises, oil
exploration and refineries, and tourist meccas that are the principal cause of most
of the current environmental deterioration, could be exercised by small plot culti-
vators and artisans who draw on centuries of experience and knowledge in their
exploitation of resources.").
However, Professor Nash's comments were prepared for an April 1994 con-
ference and so were unable to take account of developments since the Chiapas
uprising.
24. See Chomsky, supra note 7; Peasant Guerilla Army in Chiapas State De-
clares War on Federal Government, supra note 7; Population Urged to Overthrow
'Dictator,' supra note 7.
25. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Dec. 8, 1993,
U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter Supplemental Agreement]. The agree-
ment was ratified by the U.S. Congress on November 17, 1993, signed by leaders
of the three nations on December 8, 1993, and became effective January 1, 1994.
For a discussion of the Supplemental Agreement, see infra subpart II.A.2.
26. On the economic and political isolation of Chiapas, see Nash, supra note
23, at 371-93. Of course, the situation leading to popular revolt is complicated.
But it is worth stressing the extent to which unfettered economic development can
be a major factor in social turmoil. See, e.g., Nathaniel C. Nash, Latin American
Speedup Leaves Poor in the Dust, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1994, at Al (noting that
[tihe uprising in January of peasant Indians in the Mexican state of Chiapas . . .
sent shock waves through many [Latin American] capitals, [and] was viewed as a
result of Mexico's inattention to rural poverty and delays in land reform.").
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This Article does propose, however, that environmental protec-
tion under NAFTA is one of several areas that deserves a
stricter review in light of recent events. Given the desire of all
NAFTA signatories not to experience the sort of tragic social
disruption recently witnessed in Rwanda and Cuba, reform of
NAFTA should center both on elevating living standards, as
well as preventing some of the socially unsettling consequences
of industrial and commercial development that will attend the
increased trade among the Agreement's signatories." In doing
so, the NAFTA signatories will thus help appease at least
some of the concerns of the Chiapas rebels (and of others who
are likely to follow their example). The risk of not doing so is
that, in ten or in twenty years, the United States will face
further refugee crises along its southern border, crises exacer-
bated by, among other possible triggers, environmental malfea-
sance.28 The importance of re-evaluating NAFTA's weak envi-
ronmental safegaurds was underscored by the recent an-
nouncement that the U.S. government will seek to expand the
trade pact throughout the Americas.29
27. In other words, it will be necessary to amend NAFTA. NAFTA Article
2202 provides for amendment:
Article 2202: Amendments
1. The Parties may agree on any modification of or addition to
this Agreement.
2. When so agreed, and approved in accordance with the applicable
legal procedures of each Party, a modification or addition shall constitute
an integral part of this Agreement.
North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 2202,
32 I.L.M. 289, 605, 702 [hereinafter NAFTA].
28. The urgency of this suggestion was recently revealed by preliminary judg-
ments that the Supplemental Agreement is proving ineffective. See, e.g., Allen R.
Myerson, Trade Pact Side Deal Bears Little: Mexico, U.S. Contest Environmental
Pact, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 17, 1994, at D1 (quoting, inter alia, Sierra Club Executive
Director Carl Pope to the effect that "[t]here has been very little progress ....
During the debate [on NAFTA], we kept saying that unless trade is contingent on
progress [in environmental regulation], progress won't occur."). Moreover, the sug-
gestion of insurrection triggered by environmental malfeasance has recently been
documented elsewhere in the world. Todd Lappin, Can Green Mix with Red?, THE
NATION, Feb. 14, 1994, at 193, 195 (reporting environmental riots in the People's
Republic of China).
29. James Brooke, U.S. and 33 Hemisphere Nations Agree to Create Free-Trade
Zones, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1994, at Al (noting that Rep. Newt Gingrich wrote to
President Clinton offering support for "fast track" negotiating authority on a trade
treaty in exchange for withdrawal of environmental and labor conditions from
trade bills); David E. Sanger, U.S. Envisions an Expansion of Free Trade in Hemi-
sphere, N.Y. TIAIES, Dec. 8, 1994, at A14.
BROOK. J. INTL L.
The argument is divided into two main parts. In the first
part, this Article will re-examine the provisions in NAFTA and
the Supplemental Agreement. NAFTA may represent, in for-
mer U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Administrator
William Reilly's oft-repeated phrase, "the most environmental-
ly sensitive trade... agreement ever negotiated anywhere."3
However, this re-examination will suggest that, in light of
recent events, its environmental sensitivities are likely to be
insufficient if the larger goal is both increased trade and social
stability. A subsidiary aim of this section will be to identify
those provisions that most compromise the goal of environmen-
tal equity. That is, the section will endorse reconsideration of
NAFTA in light of the idea that the most environmentally
burdensome and potentially dangerous activities ought first to
be minimized and second, where unavoidable, these activities
should be distributed equally throughout a society or, in this
case, several societies.3' In the second part, this Article will
look at principles of international environmental law that
could be relied upon to shape the future under NAFTA. The
focus of this section will be to identify principles that would
more truly link trade and environmental goals so as to help
ensure economic growth, environmental protection and political
stability.
30. News Conference with William Reilly, EPA Administrator, in FED. NEWS
SERV., Aug. 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
31. The literature on environmental equity, much of it written in the past
couple of years, is voluminous. A good introductory bibliography appears in Rich-
ard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of
Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 791 n.14 (1992); see also Center
on Race, Poverty & the Environment, Environmental Justice Course Syllabi (June
1994) (available from the California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation, San Fran-
cisco).
On environmental equity in an international context, see R.S. Pathak, In-
ternational Trade and Environmental Development: A View From India, 1 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 325, 334-38, 340 (1994) (repeating the widely held view of
developing countries that "[rlestructuring [of the international economic system) is
imperative if 'an open, equitable, secure, non-discriminatory and predictable multi-
lateral trading system . . .of benefit to all trading partners is to be established.'")
(quoting Report of the United Nations Conference on Environmental Development,
Rio de Janerio, June 3-14, 1992, 46th Sess., Annex II at 14, U.N. Doc.
AICONF.151126 (1992)).
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II. NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Consider the following hypothetical. Since the passage of
NAFTA, a large U.S.-based petrochemical manufacturer has
expanded the scale of one of its maquiladora"2 operations by
100%. The company further plans, within the next two years,
to turn it into a full-scale chemical and pesticide manufactur-
ing operation. The manufacturer is, under the terms of current
law, required to ship its hazardous waste back to the U.S. for
proper treatment and disposal." However, like the vast ma-
jority of U.S.-based maquiladora operators, the manufacturer
fails to do so."
One day, as a result of employee error, thousands of gal-
lons of hydrofluoric acid 5 are inadvertently discharged into a
32. The maquiladora program was established by the Mexican government in
1965. "It allows duty-free imports of manufacturing components to Mexico for pro-
cessing or assembly of products that must then be exported from Mexico unless
special approval is given to sell them in the Mexican market." U.S. GENERAL AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO/GGD-92-113, U.S.-MEXICO TRADE: ASSESSMENT OF
MEXICO'S ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS FOR NEW COMPANIES 1 n.1 (1992). Shortly
before NAFTA was submitted to the U.S. Congress for discussion, there were just
under 2,000 maquiladoras along the border between the United States and Mexico.
See Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Gerrard, The North American Free Trade
Agreement, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 27, 1992, at 3. The literature on the problems asso-
ciated with the maquiladoras and NAFTA is considerable. For an introduction, see
David Voight, Note, The Maquiladora Problem in the Age of NAFTA: Where Will
We Find Solutions?, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 323 (1993).
33. Annex III to the Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Im-
provement of the Environment in the Border Area, Nov. 12, 1986, U.S.-Mex., art.
XI, T.I.A.S. No. 11,269. The underlying agreement on the border area is the
Agreement to Cooperate in the Solution of Environmental Problems in the Border
Area, Aug. 14, 1983, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. No. 10,827.
34. Association Report, supra note 21, at 49 ("Under current law, these [U.S.-
based, maquiladora-operating] firms ... ship their hazardous waste back to the
U.S., obligations ignored by as many as 8 out of 10 maquiladoras."); see also U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, et al., Integrated Environmental Plan For The
U.S.-Mexico Border Area, at 111-25 (Working Draft, Aug. 1, 1991) ("In practice, the
actual fate of waste generated by industry and the extent of the return of such
wastes to the U.S. have not been monitored."). The final border plan was released
by EPA and SEDUE on February 25, 1992.
35. This is an exaggerated version of an actual situation. At a maquiladora
partially owned by DuPont, the company regularly compensated farmers around
the Quimica Fluor plant in Matamoros, Mexico for crop damage caused by contam-
ination from the substance. See Jane Jeuffer, Clouds of Concern Near Toxic Plants,
S.F. CHRON., Nov. 16, 1988, at 2/Zl; Council on Economic Priorities, DuPont: A
Report on the Company's Environmental Policies and Practices DD-44 (1991) (on
file with author). In fact, concern over a Bhopal-style disaster led President
Salinas to declare an Intermediate Safeguard Zone in January 1991. The Zone
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tributary of the Rio Grande, on the banks of which the
maquiladora operates. The tributary is the principal water
supply for drinking, bathing, cooking and washing of the clus-
ter of poor towns nearby, many of whose residents work at the
maquiladora for low wages. As the people of the towns contin-
ue to use the water, at first unaware of the danger, there is
resulting widespread illness and several dozen fatalities. Be-
cause neither NAFTA nor the Supplemental Agreement incor-
porate the "polluter pays" principle, 6 the company denies re-
sponsibility and it is unclear whether Mexican or U.S. taxpay-
ers or both will be responsible for the clean-up and the health-
related costs. In the ensuing publicity, a regional affiliate 7 of
Subcommander Marcos declares that the environmental disas-
ter is a demonstration of NAFTA's failure to protect the envi-
ronment and the health and the lives of the Mexican people.
This affiliate then calls for a widespread, violent campaign
against "imperialist, neo-colonial foreign firms doing business
in Mexico with the blessing of the tyrannical, PRI-led govern-
ment."
Following this announcement, a series of violent clashes
with police erupt all across the country. They become most
serious at the maquiladoras, along the U.S.-Mexican border,
where foreign-owned firms continue to be concentrated. Several
assembly facilities are severely sabotaged, and the government
responds with a terrifying show of force and intimidation to
quell the disruptions. Skirmishes escalate into a populist revolt
along the border region, and whole towns catch fire, resulting
in the unanticipated migration of tens of thousands of people
into Texas border towns like Del Rio, El Paso and McAllen; the
San Diego area also suddenly finds itself without sufficient
resources to handle the overwhelming influx of Mexican immi-
grants,8 and squalid refugee camps emerge all along the U.S.
prohibits settlement within a one-fourth mile radius of Quimica Fluor, forcing the
evacuation of 10,000 families. Patrick McDonnell, Mexicans Fear Plant Could
Cause 'Next Bhopal', L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1991, at A21. Quimica Fluor claims
there have been no serious leaks since a release in 1980 that killed two workers
and injured five others. See also Lappin, supra note 28.
36. See infra subpart III-A.
37. In fact, in the spring of 1994, peasant guerrilla groups, like those over-
seen by Subcommander Marcos, were active in Chiapas and other Southern Mexi-
can states, such as Oaxaca and Yucatdn, and elsewhere in the southern and cen-
tral portion of the state. See Ilan Stavans, Mexico: Things Fall Apart, IN THESE
TIMES, Apr. 18, 1994, at 21.
38. This is not a far-fetched notion. During the flow of desperate immigrants
594 [Vol. XX:3
NAFTA: STABILITY AND EQUITY
side of the border. A cholera outbreak is suddenly feared by
representatives of the Red Cross and of the international medi-
cal relief group, Doctors Without Borders. Dysentery is wide-
spread, causing worries among U.S. citizens in the border
towns that their health and well-being are imperilled as well.
In an election year, the crisis becomes the focus of the
President's ability to govern.
When President Clinton took office and aggressively
worked in his first months to advocate free trade, this scenario
might have seemed far-fetched. But the Chiapas rebellion,
which demonstrated the very direct consequences on domestic
politics of regional treaty commitments, shows how quickly
events can alter our perceptions. The question then is whether
NAFTA and the Supplemental Agreement provide guidance to
help insure that situations like the one described above do not
occur.
An important attempt to answer this question has come,
since the early 1980s, from the environmental equity move-
ment. 9 This effort, which brings together disparate groups of
people opposing environmental hazards to which they claim
they are disproportionately subject because of their poverty
from Cuba in August 1994, detention centers for the migrants had to be estab-
lished in Texas because the Florida centers were filled to capacity. Flight From
Cuba: The Arrivals; As Florida Center is Filled, Cubans Are Taken to Texas, N.Y.
TIES, Aug. 26, 1994, at A13. Not only can this situation create a national and
international crisis, it can create domestic interstate tension as well. See Deborah
Sontag, Illegal Aliens Put Uneven Load on States, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
15, 1994, at A14.
The pollution in the maquiladora corridor has already reached severe pro-
portions. Students of the area report that industrial wastes are routinely disposed
of in local sewer systems, and hazardous waste drums are often dumped in the
desert or in someone's backyard. Recycled waste drums have been sold to Mexican
citizens, who in turn use them to store their drinking water. A "disturbing num-
ber" of babies born near Brownsville, Texas have been born with partial or no
brains; the childhood leukemia rate there has increased from one in 1990 to seven
in 1992. No firm evidence of the cause is available, but many blame these devel-
opments on the area's high percentage of toxins. Michael Scott Freeley & Eliza-
beth Knier, Environmental Considerations of the Emerging United States-Mexico
Free Trade Agreement, 2 DUKE J. COMP. & INTL L. 259, 266 (1992).
39. The growing environmental equity/environmental justice legal literature is
vast. For a good basic introduction to the issue, see Lazarus, supra note 31;
Pathak, supra note 31; Center on Race, Poverty, & the Environment, supra note
31. For a description of the slightly different ideological connotations of the phras-
es "environmental justice," "environmental equity" and "environmental racism," see
Colin Crawford, Strategies for Environmental Justice: Rethinking CERCLA Medical
Monitoring Lawsuits, 74 B.U. L. REV. 267, 268 n.1 (1994).
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and race or ethnicity, observes no national boundaries.40 In
light of the recent events in Mexico adverted to above, it is
wholly appropriate to revisit these issues with respect to
NAFTA. Given Mexico's comparative poverty next to the U.S.
and Canada, it is especially appropriate to do so with environ-
mental equity concerns in mind.
A. NAFTA's Environmentally-Related Protections
On September 15, 1993, the day after President Clinton
signed NAFTA's Supplemental Agreement dealing with the
environment and labor, Secretary of State Warren Christopher
addressed the Senate Finance Committee.4' Secretary Chris-
topher asked the Committee to consider various NAFTA-relat-
ed issues, including, inter alia, "the relationship between
NAFTA and illegal immigration" and the problem of cross-
boundary pollution.42 "Like illegal immigration," he noted,
"pollution does not observe political boundaries.""3  The
Secretary's comments strikingly fail to link the two problems of
illegal immigration and the environment.
The Secretary, and those who likewise support his posi-
tion, view the problem of illegal immigration as springing from
a lack of economic opportunity, rather than being a response to
a broader range of factors." Thus, the Secretary observed,
stating a widely held, pro-business view: "As Mexico's economy
prospers, higher wages and greater opportunity will reduce the
pressure for illegal migration to the United States."4" By con-
trast, although he viewed pollution control as desirable, it was
40. See, e.g., Xavier Carlos Vasquez, The North American Free Trade Agree-
ment and Environmental Racism, 34 HARV. INTL L.J. 357, 379 (1993) (expressing
concern, "that the lives and health of individuals affected by NAFTA should not be
subsumed by purely economic concerns.").
41. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, supra note 21.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. This arguably reflects a weakness of NAFTA in general, namely the fact
that every related issue is viewed through the prism of its trade effects, rather
than trade being one issue that needs to be addressed in cementing solid interna-
tional relations. See, e.g., Daniel A. Seligman, Sierra Club Analysis of The North
American Free Trade Agreement and North American Agreement on Environmen-
tal Cooperation 6 (Oct. 6, 1993) (on file with author) ("NAFTA, in effect, regards
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described by Secretary Christopher as having neither a social
nor an immigration-related dimension:
Unlike any previous trade agreement, NAFTA explicitly links
trade with the environment and that is an important achieve-
ment in itself. The side agreement just negotiated will im-
prove the enforcement of environmental laws and increase
cross-border cooperation to curb pollution.46
On close examination of the text of both NAFTA and the Sup-
plemental Agreement, what is striking about the Secretary's
statement is his confidence. That the Supplemental Agreement
was an important achievement-and a rare one-in the context
of a free trade negotiation is indisputable, but there is abso-
lutely no certainty that the Supplemental Agreement "will
improve" either enforcement or cooperation to curb pollu-
tion.47 On the contrary, NAFTA's environmentally related pro-
visions are highly general in character, and dispute resolution
for environmental concerns is both secretive and largely closed
to the public. Moreover, a review of the Agreements' environ-
mentally related provisions confirms that they guarantee little
in terms of a cleaner environment, and may in fact make natu-
ral resource exploitation, one of the central concerns of the
Chiapas rebels, as likely as the trade pact's many critics al-
leged. Conceivably, the Agreements' inattention to environ-
mental equity questions could therefore have widespread, di-
sastrous consequences.
1. NAFTA's Text
Two of NAFTA's articles are commonly agreed to consti-
tute the Agreement's key provisions affecting the environment.
Other provisions may also affect questions of environmental
protection.
a. Sanitary and Phytosanitay Measures
The first NAFTA provision relating to the environment is
Article Seven, which pertains to sanitary and phytosanitary
measures.48 A review of Chapter Seven confirms that
46. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, supra note 21, at 625.
47. Id.
48. The phrase "sanitary and phytosanitary measures is the arcane term used
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NAFTA's signatories agreed to few measures that would guar-
antee a healthy and habitable environment.
Article Seven undertakes "to establish a framework of
rules and disciplines to guide the development, adoption and
enforcement of sanitary and phytosanitary measures," and
"applies to any such measure of a party that may, directly or
indirectly, affect trade" among NAFTA's signatories.49 From
the perspective of one who recognizes tougher environmental
standards as serving the long-term goals of economic growth
and political stability, Chapter Seven's particular provisions
governing the establishment of sanitary and phytosanitary
measures are frustratingly vague. Thus, NAFTA parties are
allowed to adopt any measure that is "necessary" for the "pro-
tection of human, animal, or plant life or health. . . , including
a measure more stringent than an international standard,
guideline or recommendation."" Moreover, the agreement
provides that, notwithstanding any other provision in Chapter
Seven, a party may "establish its appropriate level of protec-
tion in accordance with Article 715,""' which pertains to risk
assessment.52 Article 715 describes the factors that must be
taken into account in conducting a risk assessment, including,
for example, "relevant scientific evidence" 3 and "relevant eco-
logical and other environmental conditions."54
Once again, the clear worry raised by these provisions is
in GATT [the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,] for environmental protec-
tion." Kass & Gerrard, supra note 32, at 29. "Phyto" is a Greek root indicating
plants. WEBSTER's NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 888 (1986).
49. NAFTA, supra note 27, art. 709.
50. Id. art. 712(1).
51. Id. art. 712(2).
52. Id. art. 715 (Risk Assessment and Appropriate Level of Protection).
53. Id. art. 715(1)(b).
54. Id. art. 715(1)(f). The merits of risk assessment continue to be debated.
For example, in his recent book, Stephen Breyer argued that risk assessment can
serve a key role in solving many of the inadequacies of current regulatory policy
in areas such as environmental regulation. Breyer contends that the current regu-
latory scheme creates a "vicious circle [of diminishing public trust in regulatory
institutions ... [that] inhibits] more rational regulation." STEPHEN BREYER,
BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION. The way to
break this circle is, he says, to create a 'self-reinforcing institutional change" in
the form of a more centralized approach to risk regulation, the centerpiece of
which would be risk assessment. Id. at 55. Breyer's views of the merits of risk
assesment strategies have been criticized as overly narrow and unable to take
account of a variety of human motivations. See, e.g., Victor B. Flatt, Book Review,
Should the Circle Be Unbroken?, 24 EN vTL. L. 1001 (forthcoming 1994).
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that the meaning of what is "necessary" or "relevant" is at best
open to wide interpretation. At worst, some NAFTA critics
have argued, the precedents for interpretation of vague phras-
es like "necessary" under GATT (the likely model for resolution
of NAFTA disputes) have disfavored stricter environmental
controls as impediments to free trade.55 Furthermore, as crit-
ics have failed to note, the sanitary and phytosanitary mea-
sures contemplated by Chapter Seven appear to be directed
primarily to adverse effects on plant and animal life by "pest
or disease," such as threats to agricultural products.56 Thus, a
risk assessment that took a conservative approach to environ-
mental protection could easily be deemed outside the scope of
the sanitary and phytosanitary measures contemplated by
Article Seven. 7
55. See Seligman, supra note 44.
56. Article 715 refers consistently to risk assessments being conducted, for
instance, to eradicate "the pest or disease" in a party's territory. NAFTA, supra
note 27, arts. 715(1)(e), 715(2), 715(2)(b). The focus on pests and disease is not
confined to this provision, but appears elsewhere in Chapter Seven. See, e.g., id.
art. 716.
Signatories to other international trade agreements have also incorporated
provisions on risk assessment. The European Economic Community, for example,
has ordered risk assessment of "any new substance placed on the market" so as
"to avoid disparities between Member States which not only affect the functioning
of the internal market but also do not guarantee the same level of protection of
man and the environment throughout the Community ... ." Commission Directive
93/67/EEC of 20 July 1993 Laying Down the Principles for Assessment of Risks to
Man and the Environment of Substances Notified in Accordance with Council Di-
rective 67/548/EEC 1993 O.J. (L 227). The Communities' risk assessment guide-
lines are quite detailed. Id.
57. For example, a risk assessment on a sanitary or phytosanitary measure
drafted to protect human, plant, and animal life from the threat of hazardous sub-
stances might be found to exceed the scope of Article 715 because of the Article's
focus on pests and disease. NAFTA, supra note 27, art. 715. One possible response
would be to focus on Article 104, which concerns NAFTA's "Relation to Environ-
mental and Conservation Agreements." Id. art. 104. Article 104 provides that any
inconsistency between NAFTA and "the specific trade obligations set out in," inter
alia, the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazard-
ous Wastes and Their Disposal, United Nations Environmental Programme Docu-
ment 16.80/3, Mar. 22, 1989, shall be resolved in favor of the earlier convention.
Id. However, the interpretation of such inconsistencies is extremely uncertain,
since Article 104 adds cryptically that "such obligations [meaning those in the
earlier treaty] shall prevail [only] to the extent of the inconsistency" between
NAFTA and the other agreement. Id. Article 104 continues: "where a Party has a
choice among equally effective and reasonably available means of complying with
such obligations [again meaning those imposed by the other treaties], the Party
chooses the alternative that is the least inconsistent with other provisions of this
Agreement." Id. Phrases like "equally effective" and "reasonably available" are, of
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Moreover, in determining the appropriate level of protec-
tion indicated by a risk assessment, a NAFTA party is re-
quired, "with the objective of achieving consistency in such
levels, [to] avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in such
levels in different circumstances, where such distinctions re-
sult in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against a good
of another Party or constitute a disguised restriction on trade
between the Parties."58 This provision, with its injunction
against "arbitrary or unjustifiable" acts and "disguised restric-
tions" on trade, could easily be used to force a downward har-
monization of laws with respect to the level of environmental
protection required by parties to the free trade pact.59
In free trade disputes, claims about arbitrary action have
resulted in successful challenges to higher environmental stan-
dards. 0 The possibility of downward harmonization is made
course, the lawyer's weasel words, and permit wide disagreement.
58. NAFTA, supra note 27, art. 715(3)(b).
59. The worry about downward harmonization has been of central concern to
NAFTA's critics, and is hardly a sensationalist one. See, e.g., James E. Bailey,
Free Trade and the Environment-Can NAFTA Reconcile the Irreconcilable?, 8 AM.
U. J. INTL L. & POLY 839, 856 (1993); Farah Khakee, The North American Free
Trade Agreement: The Need to Protect Transboundary Water Agreements, 16
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 848, 872 (1993); Walter R. Mead, Bushism Found. A Second.
Term Agenda Hidden in Trade Agreements, HARPER'S, Sept. 1992, at 37, 39-40.
One worry in the U.S. about downward harmonization concerns the so-called
Delaney Clause, codified at 21 U.S.C.A. § 379(e)(b)(5)(B) (West Supp. 1994), which
provides that color additives,
shall be deemed unsafe, and shall not be listed, for any use which will
or may result in ingestion of all or part of such additive, if the additive
is found ... to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if it
is found .. . , after tests which are appropriate for the evaluation of the
safety of additives for use in food to induce cancer in man or ani-
mal ....
Id. The worry is that the Delaney Clause's strict prohibition on the use of carcino-
genic food additives will be challenged under NAFTA. See Robert F. Housman &
Paul M. Orbuch, Integrating Labor and Environmental Concerns into the North
American Free Trade Agreement: A Look Back and a Look Ahead, 8 AMl. U. J.
INT'L L. & POLY 719, 736 (1993). In any event, the Clinton Administration has
threatened to allow certain de minimus percentages of carcinogens in food addi-
tives, thus amending the Delaney Clause. See Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d
1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
60. The best known example was the U.S.-Mexico tuna dolphin case. See
Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991) (enjoining the
importation of yellowfin tuna from Mexico because it was caught in purse seine
nets, which also take in dolphins, in violation of the U.S. Marine Mammal Protec-
tion Act). This result puts U.S. law in direct conflict with the GATT. See United
States: Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. D521/R (Sept. 3, 1991). Similar
conflicts have arisen within the European Communities in the so-called "Danish
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even more likely by other portions of Article Seven, which
repeat the requirement that phytosanitary measures be non-
discriminatory,6 and designed "only to the extent necessary
to achieve its appropriate level of protection,"62 and prohibit-
ing any "disguised restriction on trade."63 NAFTA's relevant
definition section for this provision is completely unhelpful,
providing only that the "appropriate level of protection means
the level of protection of human, animal or plant life or health
in the territory of a Party that the Party considers appropri-
ate."' Although this might be read as a bow to each party's
desire to maintain its national sovereignty,65 its tautological
definition (vis., what a party says is appropriate is appropriate)
does nothing to resolve the likely eventuality of challenges
claiming that a measure is a trade impediment. Furthermore,
and of significance to the argument advanced in this Article, it
does not encourage private companies to observe higher envi-
ronmental standards as a means to advance their shared in-
terest in economic and political stability.
Admittedly, Chapter Seven insists that a measure result-
ing "in a level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection different
from that which would be achieved by a measure based on a
relevant international standard, guideline or recommendation
shall not for that reason alone be presumed to be inconsistent"
with other provisions.66 However, the fact that a measure is
not presumed to be inconsistent is likely to prove of little help
in establishing higher environmental standards if it can other-
wise be shown to impede free trade. In the case of hazardous
materials, for instance, some science is going to be available to
"prove" that there is no short-term risk to sanitation or
phytosanitation, even if the "precautionary principle" (the
notion that where there is scientific uncertainty about the
Bottles" and "Wallonian Waste" cases. See Marina Wheeler, Greening the EEC
Treaty, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW 85, 90-96. (Philippe Sands ed., 1993).
61. NAFTA, supra note 27, art. 712(4).
62. Id. art. 712(5).
63. Id. art. 6.
64. Id. art. 724.
65. Typically, NAFTA's conservative critics are seriously concerned with na-
tional sovereignty. See Jerry Taylor, NAFTA's Green Accords: Sound and Fury
Signifying Little, POL'Y ANALYSIS Nov. 17, 1993, at 1. Taylor's article is a publica-
tion of a conservative think tank, the Cato Institute.
66. NAFTA, supra note 27, art. 713(2).
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environmental effect of an act, the appropriate response is the
most conservative one) would argue against taking the risk.67
A NAFTA party may further request an explanation in
writing of the reasons for a sanitary or phytosanitary measure
that the challenging party believes adversely affects trade.6"
The international standards against which any such chal-
lenged regulation would be judged are those contained in docu-
ments such as the Codex Alimentarius, which has routinely
been criticized by consumer and environmental groups as offer-
ing insufficient protection to individuals and favoring corporate
67. The precautionary principle is discussed more fully infra part III.B; see
also James Cameron, The GATT and the Environment, in GREENING INTERNATION-
AL LAW, supra note 60, at 100, 117-19. Barry Commoner, the scientist and social
critic, has eloquently advocated increased emphasis on pollution prevention as a
means of implementing appropriate precautions. Commoner stresses that new tech-
nologies are central to preventing ecological devastation. He writes: "Prevention
succeeds because it is directed at the origin of the pollutant in the production
process itself-the vast and varied machinery of industry, agriculture,
transportation and manufacturing. We can then see that each of the few successful
environmental improvements has been acheived by altering the techology of pro-
duction." BARRY COMMONER, MAKING PEACE WITH THE PLANET 44 (1992) (emphasis
in original). He goes on to discuss, for example, technological change that allowed
reductions in mercury poisoning of Lake Erie. Id. Commoner further helps explain
the logical extension of the precautionary principle, namely a re-examination of the
environmental effect of current modes of production. This could mean, for instance,
a realization that,
[u]nlike the steel, auto, or electric power industries, the petrochemical
industry - at least on its present scale - is not essential. Nearly all of
the products of the petrochemical industry are substitutes for perfectly
serviceable preexisting ones. Plastics substitute for paper, wood, and
metals; detergents for soap; nitrogen fertilizer for soil organic matter and
nitrogen-fixing crops . . [;] pesticides for the insects' natural predators.
Id. at 53.
An example of a case where application of the precautionary principle might
have helped avoid a current crisis is in the introduction of massive chemical pesti-
cides and fertilizers to the developing world, which "represent[s] the cutting edge
of the green revolution [in India in the 1960's], which has led to the devastation
of the soils [in India]." Morning Edition: Indians Destroy American-Based Seed
Company, National Public Radio broadcast, Nov. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS,
News Library, NPR File. The speaker was commenting on the reasons for riots in
southern India against multi-national U.S. hybrid seed producers. High-yield hy-
brid seeds could only be effective when used in combination with heavy-and ex-
pensive--doses of chemical pesticides and fertilizers, thus attracting the farmers'
ire. See also All Things Considered. Searching for Solutions-India and Food Pro-
duction, National Public Radio broadcast, Aug. 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, NPR File (The reporter talked with Minindra Phal, a south Indian farmer
who stopped spraying with pesticides because they made him sick. Phal successful-
ly proved that he could have better yields without the use of chemical fertilizers.).
68. NAFTA, supra note 27, art. 713(4).
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interests.69 Moreover, parties are exhorted, "to the greatest
extent practicable" 0 to "pursue equivalence of their respective
sanitary or phytosanitary measures."7'
In sum, the environmental provisions in Chapter Seven
reflect the fact that environmental and trade concerns were
generally conceived of as antagonists, rather than as part of a
comprehensive approach to promoting the economic health and
security of people as citizens, workers and consumers; this fact
bodes ill for potential environmental crises, particularly given
the current, unstable Mexican political situation.
There is, however, one provision in Chapter Seven that
opens a possible means for using NAFTA to serve environmen-
tal, economic, and social cooperation at once. Article 721(1)
provides as follows:
Each Party shall, on the request of another Party, facilitate
the provision of technical advice, information and assistance,
on mutually agreed terms and conditions, to enhance that
Party's sanitary and phytosanitary measures and related
activities, including research, processing technologies, infra-
structure and the establishment of national regulatory bod-
ies. Such assistance may include credits, donations and
69. Id. art. 713(5). For a brief description of the Codex Alimentarius, see
Daniel G. Partan, Note & Comment, International Administrative Law, 75 AM. J.
INTVL L. 639, 642-43 (1981) (citing DAVID LENE, INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY RE-
GIMES: CASE STUDIES IN HEALTH, METEOROLOGY AND FOOD, at xx (1976)); C. Ford
Runge, Trade Protectionism and Environmental Regulations: The New Nontariff
Barriers, 11 J. INT'L L. BUS. 47 (1993) (criticizing the fact that although "[a] spe-
cial technical working group at the GATT Secretariat in Geneva is attempting to
use [the Codex Alimentarius] . . . as the basis for harmonizing member countries'
regulations .... there are no agreed-upon standards except for a few items, and
none are regarded as binding in law. With the exception of the beleaguered GATT
working group, the issue has not been given priority by international institu-
tions."). Id. at 59.
70. NAFTA, supra note 27, art. 756(1).
71. Id.
72. Despite Mr. Zedillo's election, many Mexico-watchers remain concerned
that the political and social situation remains extremely unsettled. See Reavis,
supra note 16; DePalma supra note 9.
The fact that NAFTA did not view trade and environmental concerns-in
addition to labor concerns--as part of a unified trade strategy was a routine con-
cern of the Agreement's early critics, a fact lost on many of their opponents, who
labeled the environmental-and labor-critics as wild-eyed radicals. See, e.g.,
Nightline: The Environmental Movement's Latest Enemy (WABC television broad-
cast, Feb. 4, 1992) available in LEXIS, News Library, ABC File (broadcast fea-
tured conservative commentator Rush Limbaugh); Chethan Lakshman, NAFTA Will
Offset U.S. Power: Godsoe, FIN. POST, Sept. 23, 1992, at 5.
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grants for the acquisition of technical expertise, training and
equipment that will facilitate the Party's adjustment to and
compliance with a Party's sanitary or phytosanitary mea-
sure.
7 3
This provision is potentially significant because, in the jargon
of international law, it directs that "technology transfer" oc-
cur.74 The obvious problem is that, despite the imperative di-
rection that parties "shall... facilitate" 5 the provision of
advice and assistance, the command is weakened by the quali-
fication that this happen only on mutually agreed terms, which
"may"76 include credits, donations and grants.77 Moreover,
subsequent sections of the provision make it quite clear that it
should not be understood as forcing any technology or economic
transfers whatsoever.7 ' Nonetheless, the provision remains an
important statement as to the appropriate direction for a more
73. NAFTA, supra note 27, art. 721(1).
74. The literature on technology transfer is vast. See, e.g., THE WORLD COM-
MISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 76 (1991)
("Global poverty cannot be reduced by the governments of poor countries acting
alone. At the same time, more aid and other forms of finance, while necessary,
are not sufficient. Projects and programmes must be designed for sustainable de-
velopment."), National Science and Technology Council, Technology for a Sustain-
able Future: A Framework for Action 20 (1994) (on file with author) (stating inten-
tion of U.S. government to, inter-alia, "foster technology cooperation that incorpo-
rates assessment of needs, information exchange, training and technical assistance,
capacity building, and technology development."). The basic concern, as stated by
the Vice President and General Counsel of The World Bank, is that "a host state
concerned with the transfer of technology and skills is obviously interested in
maximizing the local proportion of personnel." IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, LEGAL TREAT-
MENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 81 (1993). Not only does the host state want to
keep local personnel but also, Mr. Shihata might have added, the host state has
an interest in keeping control over who shares their technology and how. On these
and related questions of technology transfer, see GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN, ACTION
PLAN TO ARREST GLOBAL WARMING, DECISION MADE BY THE COUNCIL OF MINIS-
TERS FOR GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT CONSERVATION 15-17 (1990); Jonathan D.
Westreich, Regulatory Controls on United States Exports of Weapons and Weapons
Technology: The Failure to Enforce the Arms Export Control Act, 7 ADMIN. L. J.
AM. U. 463 (1993).
75. NAFTA, supra note 27, art. 721(1).
76. Id.
77. For one exploration of the possible use of NAFTA to promote a "greener"
free trade regime, see Nicolas Kublicki, The Greening of Free Trade: NAFTA, Mexi-
can Environmental Law, and Debt Exchanges for Mexican Environmental Infra-
structure Development, 19 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 59 (1994).
78. "Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a Party to . . . fur-
nish any information the disclosure of which would . . . prejudice the legitimate
commercial interests of particular enterprises." NAFTA, supra note 27, art. 172(b).
NAFTA: STABILITY AND EQUITY
comprehensive trade plan that links trade and environmental
concerns.
b. Standards-Related Measures
The second provision relating to the environment is con-
tained in NAFTA's Chapter Nine, which concerns the creation
of standards-related measures that may directly and indirectly
affect trade among NAFTA's signatories. 9 NAFTA's stan-
dards-related measures are important to the goal of environ-
mental protection because they relate to a party's right to
enact laws and regulations that may affect imports by another
signatory."0
At first glance, Chapter Nine appears to give NAFTA sig-
natories the sovereign right to implement environmental and
health-related laws and regulations, providing, for instance,
that: "[elach party may, in accordance with this Agreement
adopt, maintain and apply standards-related measures, includ-
ing those relating to safety, the protection of human, animal
and plant life and health, the environment and consumers, and
measures to ensure their enforcement or implementation."8
However, Chapter Nine has been criticized for promoting trade
at any cost. For instance, "[e]nvironmentalists sought, but
failed, to secure an understanding that U.S. laws regulating
production processes would not be considered trade barriers
under the GATT." 2 Because Chapter Nine fails to protect pro-
duction process-related laws and regulations, NAFTA signato-
ries continue to be bound by GATT's prohibition on any such
measures that discriminate with respect to trade.83 Thus, the
79. Id. art. 901(1).
80. Id. chap. 9.
81. Id. art. 904(1).
82. Association Report, supra note 21, at 53. The call for both process and
production standards was loud and widespread in advance of NAFTA's passage.
See, e.g., GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTr, NAFTA: AN ASSESSMENT 100-
01 (rev. ed. 1993).
83. NAFTA, supra note 27, art. 103(1); cf. Final Act Embodying the Results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Dec. 15, 1993, Annex 1A,
art. 1.3, Hein's No. KAV 3778, at 2 (Temp. State Dep't No. unreleased). The new
Annex provides, in relevant part, that
IM]embers shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared,
adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unneces-
sary obstacles to international trade. For this purpose, technical regula-
tions shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legiti-
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right to enact strict environmental and health-related controls
is less liberal than initially appears to be the case.
Moreover, Chapter Nine contains many of the vague and
ill-defined terms that give legitimate cause for worry in Chap-
ter Seven. Like Chapter Seven, Chapter Nine's provisions
relating to environmental standard-setting respect a party's
sovereignty," permitting signatories to implement any stan-
dards-related measure and to establish any level of protection
it considers "appropriate."85 One NAFTA party cannot chal-
lenge another's adoption of a higher standard unless that stan-
dard represents an "unnecessary obstacle" to trade.8" Thus,
Chapter Nine reiterates many of Chapter Seven's ambiguities.
Notably, however, Chapter Nine also contains some provi-
sions that might be interpreted as requiring the challenging
party to show that the challenged party lacks a "legitimate
objective" for enacting a standard.87 This opportunity for in-
terpretation offers a potentially significant means to enact
standards that would force upward harmonization towards
stricter environmental standards. By contrast to GATT, which
automatically assumes that a higher standard is a trade barri-
er,88 NAFTA thus allows room for NAFTA's signatories to en-
gage in a dialogue about the necessity and appropriateness of
more environmentally-protective standards. This does not,
however, address the ability of states to implement stricter
standards, a concern addressed more fully in Part 2 below.
Furthermore, although Chapter Nine, like Chapter Seven,
has occasioned the criticism that it could easily lead to down-
ward harmonization, 9 it is at least marginally more clear
mate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfillment would create.
Such legitimate objectives are, inter alia, ...protection of human health
or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment[.]
Id. art. 2.2.
Although a departure from previous restrictions, it remains to be seen how
this language will be applied.
84. NAFTA, supra note 27, art. 906.
85. Id. art. 904(2).
86. Id. art. 904(4).
87. Id. art. 904(4)(a).
88. See Bailey, supra note 59, at 852, 856.
89. Id. Some commentators believe that these concerns are overstated. See,
e.g., Kublicki, supra note 77, at 63-64; Association Report, supra note 21, at 64
("we believe that the overall approach of NAFTA and, in particular, the Supple-
mental and Border Agreements promises significant environmental benefits to the
U.S., as well as to Mexico and Canada"); see also supra note 59 and accompanying
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about what constitutes a necessary obstacle to trade. Regretta-
bly, however, the instruction that "[a]n unnecessary obstacle to
trade shall not be deemed to have been created" where the
measure's "demonstrable purpose" is to achieve a legitimate
objective, and so long as it "does not operate to exclude goods
of another Party that meet that legitimate objective"90 is far
from clear at first glance; it appears likely that what exactly
constitutes a "legitimate objective" in practice would be as dif-
ficult to ascertain as the "unnecessary obstacle" it set out to
define. The term "legitimate objective" is further defined, how-
ever, to include the safety and protection of human, animal or
plant life or health, and the environment or consumers, includ-
ing matters relating to quality and identifiability of goods or
services and sustainable development.9'
Thus, despite some of the vagueness that typifies most
treaty-writing, Chapter Nine does allow for a reasoned defense
of a measure's long-term environmental purpose. The focus on
sustainable development, a notion that received widespread
attention at the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development,92 is especially noteworthy. Although the
notion of what constitutes "sustainable" development remains
controversial, the phrase is nonetheless associated with busi-
ness practices that seriously take environmental concerns into
account. 93 As the meaning of this term is further fleshed out
in coming years, it may well provide a means to argue for
linking heightened environmental protection with the free
trade practices made possible under NAFTA.
It would be a mistake, however, to characterize Chapter
Nine as ensuring any such linkage; its ambiguities are of
greater concern than its promise in this regard. For instance,
the chapter calls for the parties to make standards-related
text for discussion on downward harmonization.
90. NAFTA, supra note 27, art. 904(4).
91. Id. art. 915.
92. Commonly known by its acronym, UNCED. The Conference was held in
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in June 1992 and resulted in the adoption of a voluminous
document known as Agenda 21, two treaties (the conventions on Biological Diversi-
ty and Climate Change) and a statement of principles on forests. See Marc
Pallemaerts, International Environmental Law from Stockholm to Rio: Back to the
Future?, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 60, at 1.
93. Christopher D. Stone, Deciphering "Sustainable Development," 69 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 977 (1994).
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measures "compatible."' On the one hand, this could be read
as an opportunity for upward harmonization, since parties are
given considerable room to defend any "legitimate objective.""
But this is far from certain. A party could equally insist that
compatibility is only possible by observing minimum stan-
dards, in order to achieve NAFTA's larger purpose." Indeed,
pro-business critics of the accord have found little cause for
concern with these provisions as a means to achieve upward
harmonization.97 Furthermore, the glacial pace of change in
international lawmaking does not bode well for the short-term
environmental protections possibly achievable in light of this
language.
c. Other Provisions
Other provisions in NAFTA provide some support for the
goal of stricter environmental protection. Some defenders of
NAFTA argue that the Agreement's objectives, as stated in its
Preamble and Article One, will help environmental con-
cerns.9" Admittedly, this language is encouraging. The Pream-
ble reaffirms the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development (Rio Declaration), both of which endorsed
notions such as sustainable development.9 In stating its ob-
jectives,' 0 NAFTA's Article One consistently links environ-
mental and economic improvement. Even more encouragingly,
the Article states that the signatories are committed to "trans-
parency," the buzzword referring to the international legal
equivalent of domestic sunshine laws.' However, the intro-
ductory commitments to transparency have since been criti-
94. NAFTA, supra note 27, arts. 906(2), 908(1).
95. Id. art. 904(4)(a).
96. Such as those stated in NAFTA's Statement of Objectives. Id. arts. 102(1)-
(2).
97. Taylor, supra note 65, at 5.
98. Daniel McGraw & Steve Charovitz, NAFTA's Repercussions: Is Green Trade
Possible?, 36 ENV'T 14 (1994).
99. Adoption of Agreements on Environment and Development, The Rio Decla-
ration on Environment and Development, UN Conference on Environment and
Development, Annex, Agenda Item 9, Principle 1, at 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.15V5/Rev.1 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
100. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 27, arts. 1(a)-(b), (g).
101. Id. art. 1(h).
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cized by those who point out that the proceedings of the actual
dispute resolution panels created by NAFTA will be conducted
in private, with virtually no public scrutiny."2 In sum, there-
fore, the introductory statements about NAFTA's environmen-
tal and economic linkages cannot be viewed as anything but
aspirational.
This is confirmed by Article 1114, which specifically con-
cerns "Environmental Measures." Article 1114 states only that
it is "inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing do-
mestic health, safety or environmental measures." The Article
concludes by saying that a NAFTA signatory may request
consultations with another signatory if the first signatory be-
lieves any such encouragement was offered.'l3 Then U.S. En-
vironmental Protection Agency Administrator William Reilly
acknowledged the toothlessness of this Article. In testimony to
102. Seligman, supra note 44, at 14.
[Tihe NAFTA dispute process remains an unacceptable forum for resolv-
ing trade and environment conflicts. First, there is no requirement that
NAFTA panels hearing challenges to environmental laws have environ-
mental experts on them (NAFTA, Article 2009.2). Proceedings are not
open to the public. Environmental or other public interest groups are not
permitted to submit arguments and evidence in proceedings as "friends of
the court."
Id.
There is, however, the possibility for limited intervention if a party claims
it has a "substantial interest" in a matter. NAFTA Articles 2008.3 and 2008.4
provide in full as follows:
3. A third Party that considers it has a substantial interest in the
matter shall be entitled to join as a complaining Party, on delivery of
written notice of its intention to participate to the disputing Parties and
its Section of the Secretariat. Such notice shall be delivered at the earli-
est possible time, and in any event no later than seven days after the
date of delivery of a request by a Party for the establishment of a panel.
4. If such Party does not join as a complaining Party in accor-
dance with paragraph 3, it normally shall refrain thereafter from initi-
ating or continuing-
(a) a dispute settlement procedure under this Agreement; or
(b) a dispute settlement proceeding in the GATT on grounds that
are substantially equivalent to those available to that Party under this
Agreement, regarding the same matter in the absence of a significant
change in economic or commercial circumstances.
NAFTA, supra note 27, art. 2008(3)-(4).
As with so many provisions in NAFTA, the crucial term affecting these sec-
tions, "substantial interest," is undefined.
103. Id. art. 1114(2). Chapter 11 relates to Investment, Services, and Related
Matters. The Article's Scope and Coverage is outlined in Article 1101. Id. art.
1101; see also Taylor, supra note 65, at 6-7 (discussing Article 1114).
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Congress in late 1992, he admitted that the U.S. "would have
no direct recourse" if it believed that relaxation of health, safe-
ty or environmental matters had occurred. °4
2. The Text of the Supplemental
Environmental Agreement. 5
Even more than NAFTA's Preamble, the Supplemental
Agreement's Preamble exhorts the signatories to observe the
highest possible standards of environmental protection by
means of cooperative action. 6 When it refers to actual levels
of protection, the Supplemental Agreement does so in the lofti-
est terms:
Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own levels
of domestic environmental protection and environmental
development policies and priorities, and to adopt or modify
accordingly its environmental laws and regulations, each
Party shall ensure that its laws and regulations provide for
high levels of environmental protection and shall strive to
continue to improve those laws and regulations."°
On the one hand, this provision is encouraging because it re-
quires that signatories "shall ensure" high levels of environ-
mental protection. It must be viewed as an achievement that,
for example, the provision lacks reference to a NAFTA party's
being able to justify environmental protectionist measures with
reference either to scientific proof or a "legitimate objec-
tive."' O8 At the very least, the absence of such qualifications
indicates a theoretical willingness to effect high levels of envi-
104. The North American Free Trade Agreement: Hearings Before the House
Ways and Means Comm. and its Subcomm. on Trade, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 147
(1992); see also Keith Schneider, Trade Pact us. Environment: Clash at a House
Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1992, at D1.
105. The Supplemental Agreement is summarized in full in John J. Kim-&
James P. Cargas, The Environmental Side Agreement to the North American Free
Trade Agreement: Background and Analysis, [1993] 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10720-33 (Dec. 1993); see also Steve Charnovitz, NAFTA: An Analysis of its
Environmental Provisions [1993] 23 Envtl L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,067-73 (Feb.
1993).
106. See, e.g., Supplemental Agreement, supra note 25, art. 1(b) ("The objectives
of this Agreement are to: . . .promote sustainable development based on coopera-
tion and mutually supportive environmental and economic policies.").
107. Id. art. 3.
108. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 90.
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ronmental protection required in the wake of increased trade
and the development that is sure to follow it in Mexico.
On the other hand, however, this provision is typical of the
Supplemental Agreement's failure to indicate what institution-
al mechanism will make achievement of these goals possible.
The Supplemental Agreement leaves enforcement of this goal
largely to the individual governments, although it does list
examples of the kinds of actions signatories may take (e.g.
"promoting environmental audits").1 °9 The non-binding char-
acter of this list only reinforces the impression of the Supple-
mental Agreement's toothlessness. As in NAFTA, the language
reflects the drafters' concern to respect sovereignty. In interna-
tional treaty-making, this is, of course, an important goal.
What is less comprehensible is why the drafters, in contraven-
tion of the "transparency" endorsed by NAFTA itself, estab-
lished a dispute resolution mechanism that can be conducted
mostly in secret."0
The Supplemental Agreement also creates a tri-partite
Commission for Environmental Cooperation, composed of a
Council, a Secretariat and a joint Public Advisory Commit-
tee."' In terms of possible public participation, the indepen-
dent Secretariat, as the institutional mechanism for monitor-
ing compliance with the terms of the Supplemental Agreement,
is the most important.
Private parties and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) are granted limited standing to submit complaints".
and "assert[] that a Party is failing to effectively enforce its
environmental law.""' A private party or NGO may attempt
to bring a claim before the Secretariat if the claim meets one of
109. Supplemental Agreement, supra note 25, art. 5(1)(f). Article 5 provides an
extensive list of the actions governments may take, constituting mostly a catalogue
of the various regulatory and enforcement measures currently pursued by U.S.
lawmakers and regulators. Id. art. 5.
110. See supra note 102 and accompanying text; see also Robert Housman &
Paul Orbuch, Integrating Labor and Environmental Concerns into the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement: A Look Back and a Look Ahead, 8 AM. U. J. INTL L.
& PoVy 719, 746 (1993).
111. Supplemental Agreement, supra note 25, art. 8(2).
112. These do not, strictly speaking, have the force of legal claims, if by that
term, one understands that a party initiates a process that must result in some
resolution. Some commentators have mistakenly used the term "claim" to describe
the process. See, e.g., Association Report, supra note 21, at 57.
113. Supplemental Agreement, supra note 25, art. 14(1).
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several criteria. The most substantive of these is the require-
ment that the Secretariat find that the submission "appears to
be aimed at promoting enforcement rather than at harassing
industry.""4 Providing that the submission satisfies these cri-
teria, "the Secretariat shall determine whether the submission
merits requesting a response from the [NAFTA] Party.""5
The Secretariat, in its turn, may consider several criteria to
determine whether to consider the allegations, including
whether private remedies have been pursued under the
NAFTA Party's laws.' 6 However, the Secretariat can also be
guided by factors such as whether "the submission is drawn
exclusively from mass media reports."" ' On the one hand,
the rationale for such a provision is understandable. The draft-
ers were clearly concerned that the mass media not foment
dissatisfaction with sensationalized reports of possibly danger-
ous harms. On the other hand, however, where private indi-
viduals or NGOs often have limited resources, the mass media
can serve as an essential vehicle for public information. For
example, in April 1986, publicity in Europe and throughout the
world was instrumental in forcing the former Soviet Union to
admit to a nuclear accident at its Chernobyl, Ukraine reac-
tor."
8
In its discretion, the Secretariat may then determine that
"the submission, in the light of any response provided by the
[NAFTA] Party, warrants developing a factual record.""' The
Secretariat thus enjoys extensive latitude to determine wheth-
er a submission raises appropriate questions for review, includ-
ing the possibility for the Party to voice its objections-presum-
ably with access to more information and with greater resourc-
es to document its case and refute any attacks.
This discretion is troubling for those concerned about the
socially destabilizing potential of environmental harms. The
114. Id. art. 14(d).
115. Id. art. 14(2).
116. Id. art. 2(c).
117. Id. art. 14(2)(d).
118. On the disastrous consequences of the "72 hour vacuum of information
about a matter of great public concern" caused by the U.S.S.R.'s unwillingness to
publicize information about the accident, see PHILIPPE SANDS, CHERNOBYL: LAW
AND COMMUNICATION 3 (1988). Sands' footnotes amply testify to the key role
played by the mass media in disseminating information about the accident. Id.
119. Supplemental Agreement, supra note 25, art. 15(1) (emphasis added).
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absence of procedural guarantees, such as the requirement, at
least, that the Secretariat explain the reasons for a decision
not to prepare a factual record on a submission, means that
many private parties and NGOs in one of NAFTA's signatory
nations may be without an effective tribunal to air their
claims. This is especially likely to be the case in Mexico, where
per capita spending on environmental protection is notoriously
low 2° and enforcement equally lags. 2' The usual argument
advanced by NAFTA's supporters holds that increased trade
will raise the standard of living, which in turn will raise the
demand for a cleaner environment.'22 What this argument
ignores, however, is that in the process of expanding trade and
commerce, environmental degradation is certain. If enforce-
ment is unlikely at home and dismissed without explanation
by the free trade regime's environmental Secretariat, the po-
tential for popular discontent seems likely, if not certain. 2 '
120. Kathryn J. Ready, NAFTA: Labor, Industry, and Government Perspectives,
in THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 37 (Mario F. Bognanno &
Kathryn J. Ready eds., 1993) (reporting that in 1991, U.S. per capita environmen-
tal protection spending by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency totaled
$24.40, as compared to $0.48 per capita by its Mexican counterpart, SEDUE.).
121. However, in advance of NAFTA's ratification, "the United States govern-
ment undertook a survey of Mexico's environmental laws that concluded that by
and large, Mexico's laws were on a par with those of its proposed NAFTA part-
ners." Robert Housman et al., Enforcement of Environmental Laws Under a Sup-
plemental Agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement, 5 GEo. INT'L
ENvTL. L. REv. 593, 594 n.3 (1993) (citing, inter alia, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, PUB. No. GAOINSIAD-91-227, U.S.-MEXICO TRADE INFORMATION ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL REGULATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT 5-6 (1991); see also Damian Frasier &
Nancy Dunne, Salinas and Clinton in NAFTA Talks, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1993, at
3. The worry about enforcement by Mexican authorities was not restricted to U.S.
environmentalists. Alberto Szekely, an environmental attorney in Mexico, aired the
same concerns to a group of New York lawyers in early 1994. Alberto Szekely,
Remarks at the Meeting of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
(Feb. 3, 1994) (notes of talk on file with author).
122. See, e.g., Association Report, supra note 21, at 56 ("The Bush
Administration's initial response to these [environmental] concerns was to assure
Congress and the public that the best antidote for pollution is economic progress
and that the increased trade and investment would enable Mexico to avoid a repe-
tition of the maquiladora experience."). But see William P. Alford, Introduction, The
North American Free Trade Agreement and the Need for Candor, 34 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 293, 295 (1993) (noting the serious dislocations that NAFTA was likely to
cause for all of its signatory nations).
123. The probability of this result was recently underlined in the related issue
of a labor dispute under NAFTA. In the first hearing held to enforce the trade
pacts labor protections (provided for in a labor side agreement comparable to the
Supplemental Agreement), a grievance panel refused to reach the merits of cases
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This worry is compounded throughout the Supplemental
Agreement, as exhibited in its direction for the Secretariat to
safeguard: "(b) from public disclosure any information it re-
ceives from any non-governmental organization or person
where the information is designated by that non-governmental
organization or person as confidential or proprietary."124 On
its face, this provision might be read as protecting the private
parties and NGOs who submit materials to the Secretariat for
review. However, the "confidential and proprietary" language
typically refers to corporate records, and so seems designed to
protect from public scrutiny industries whose activities might
cause environmental harm.
12 5
Even if the Secretariat concludes that it wishes to prepare
a factual record on a submission, it cannot actually proceed
unless the Council authorizes it to do so by a vote of two of
NAFTA's three signatories. 12' The results in the factual re-
cord, which undergo a lengthy research and review process,
can be made publicly available only by a two-thirds vote of the
Secretariat. 1
27
Admittedly, the Supplemental Agreement establishes an
elaborate committee structure designed to incorporate the
views and advice of private parties and NGOs from all three
states.28 Moreover, as in most treaties, signatories may pur-
sue disputed matters through an arbitral process designed to
brought against General Electric and Honeywell Corporations by U.S. and Mexican
unions, finding that NAFTA did not cover the enforcement of Mexican labor laws
by Mexican officials. The U.S. Secretary of Labor also refused to investigate. Peter
White, False Teeth, IN THESE TImEs, Nov. 14, 1994, at 23.
124. Supplemental Agreement, supra note 25, art. II(8)(b). Article 8(a) keeps
confidential "information it receives that could identify a non-governmental organi-
zation or person making a submission if the person or organization so re-
quests ... ." Id. art. II(8)(a).
125. Recent controversy in this connection has focused on the extent to which
information collected in corporate environmental audits should be made public, and
whether environmental audits need be performed by independent auditors. Propo-
nents of more open audits contend that such auditing will allow companies to
verify compliance and assess risks created by hazardous materials and practices.
Michael A. Gollin, Using Intellectual Property to Improve Environmental Protection,
4 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 193, 210 n.179 (1991). Many companies, however, fear that
such audits will lead to publication of protected information. See, e.g., Sanford
Lewis, Comments Regarding EPA Audit Policy from the Director of the Good
Neighbor Project for Sustainable Industries (Aug. 5, 1994) (on file with author).
126. Supplemental Agreement, supra note 25, art. 15(2).
127. Id. art. 15(7).
128. Id. arts. 16-18.
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articulate an "action plan," and even seek to assess monetary
penalties for non-compliance.'29
Cause for concern that NAFTA will create environmental
harms that could lead to popular discontent nonetheless per-
sist. The fact remains that the power to object to environmen-
tal violations remains firmly in the control and behind the
doors of NAFTA's signatory governments, with little account-
ability to the citizens of their nations except through their
domestic legal systems. By contrast, in the case of the United
States, the potential for redress of grievances, through both
rulemaking and other legal channels, is considerable if imper-
fect.30 In Mexico, which lacks both a highly developed envi-
ronmental protection infrastructure and a citizenry confident
that the government of the ruling PRI has its best interests at
heart,"' the likelihood is far greater that environmental griev-
ances flowing from increased, post-NAFTA trade will not be
satisfactorily resolved.
The question, then, is what modifications and additions to
NAFTA might strengthen the Supplemental Agreement so as
to make its free trade benefits available without potential
environmental damage and related social disquiet.
III. NAFTA AND EMERGING PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
This section will discuss three principles of international
environmental law that have increasingly gained recognition
and acceptance since UNCED. It is my contention that each of
129. See generally Supplemental Agreement, supra note 25, arts. 22-39 and
Annex 34; cf, e.g., Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties: Final Act of the 11th
Antarctic Treaty Special Consultative Meeting and the Protocol on Environmental
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, art. 18, 30 I.L.M. 1455, 1468 (1991), art. 51, 27
I.L.M. 868, 892 (1988).
130. Some commentators have explored discontent with rulemaking practices,
suggesting that they are especially burdensome to the poor, effectively locking
them out of the process. See Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environ-
mental Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619,
620 (1992); Omar Saleem, Overcoming Environmental Discrimination: The Need for
a Disparate Impact Test and Improved Notice Requirements in Facility Siting Deci-
sions, 19 COL-M. J. ENVTL. L. 211 (1994).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 12, 16, 120, 121. On the limitations of
citizen intervention in environmental law and policy-making, see Greg M. Block,
One Step Away from Environmental Citizen Suits in Mexico, 23 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,347 (1993).
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them deserves reconsideration and possible application to a
redrafted NAFTA, one that systematically incorporates the
goal of environmental protection into the main agreement.
A. "Polluter Pays" Principle
The most obvious way to begin insuring that the free trade
introduced by NAFTA does not correspondingly result in envi-
ronmental degradation and any resultant social unrest is to
incorporate immediately some formulation of the "polluter
pays" principle into NAFTA Chapter Nine, which pertains to
standards-related measures.
The 'polluter pays' principle is essentially a principle of eco-
nomic policy for allocating the costs of pollution, rather than
a legal principle .... [The Organization on Economic Cooper-
ation and Development, or] OECD's definition of the principle
is that the polluter should bear the expenses of carrying out
measures decided by public authorities to ensure that the
environment is in 'an acceptable state', or 'in other words the
cost of these measures should be reflected in the cost of goods
and services which cause pollution in production and or in
consumption.'132
In other words, the "polluter pays" principle aims simply to
internalize external costs, and to eliminate what might be
viewed as hidden subsidies in the form of cleanup costs that
would otherwise be borne directly by the government or subse-
quent property owners. Although consumers are likely to end
up paying these cleanup costs eventually in the form of higher
product costs (as opposed to higher taxes), the notion is that
the "polluter pays" principle acts as an incentive for the free
trading private company to implement more environmentally
efficient and responsible technologies in order to reduce its
environmental cleanup costs.
For the U.S. reader, the prospect can be fearsome; the
"polluter pays" principle is best known here for its incarnation
as a central feature of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),
generally recognized to be one of the nation's most unwieldy
132. PATRICIA W. BmNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ENVI-
RONMENT 109 (1992).
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statutory schemes, to say nothing of the criticisms about
CERCLA's indiscriminate foisting of liability on every "owner
or operator" connected with a hazardous waste site. 3' How-
ever, it is important to recognize that CERCLA, which provides
that parties may seek to apportion liability according to the ex-
tent of a party's obligation for past contamination, is an imper-
fect model of how the "polluter pays" principle should be for-
mulated in a trade agreement like NAFTA.
In the NAFTA context, the "polluter pays" principle should
be structured in such a way as to put industry on notice of
future harms in advance of its occurrence. Of course, certain
problems would have to be ironed out, such as making sure
that the actual, beneficial owner is held liable and not a sub-
sidiary or shell corporation. In addition, it would be necessary
to articulate guidelines so that a dispute does not become a
nationalistic fighting match.3 4 However, NAFTA signatories
could derive some comfort from the fact that the EEC is only
one of many multinational associations that has endorsed this
principle,' as has, generally speaking, the OECD'; sup-
133. CERCLA is codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-75 (West Supp. 1994). For crit-
icism of CERCLA, see Joan Glickman, A Superfund Retrospective: Past, Present
and... , 76 PUB. MGofr. 4 (1994); Courts to Blame for Much of Problem with
Superfund, Industry Attorney Says, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 632 (Aug. 13,
1993); Deborah Pines, Judge Scores CERCLA Law as 'Unfair; Ruling Refuses to
Relieve Mall Owners of Liability, N.Y. L.J., June 2, 1994, at 1.
134. For example, in Imperial County, California, and in southeastern Califor-
nia, county officials are trying to pursue extraterritorial application of U.S. laws to
clean up New River, a waterway that has been badly polluted with chemical con-
tamination from maquiladora and other waste. EPA has refused to require compa-
nies along the border to test the water but has agreed to fund state monitoring
efforts. California County's Test Rule Request Denied; EPA Offers to Help Pay for
New River Monitoring, 17 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No.35, at 2173 (Mar. 25, 1994).
One of the problems with the case is that it appears to some as if people
in the U.S. are demanding control from Mexicans without acknowledging the U.S.
role in contributing to the pollution. See, e.g., Marianne Lavelle, Poisoned Waters
Provide Early Test for NAFTA, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 21, 1994, at Al. If the "polluter
pays" principle applied equally to all three signatories, some of this finger-pointing
might be avoided, so long as controls were in place to assure that the actual pol-
luting parties were reliably identified.
On some questions related to the use of trade measures to enforce inter-
national environmental law, see Mary Ellen O'Connell, Using Trade to Enforce
International Environmental Law: Implications for United States Law, 1 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 273, 291 (1994) (concluding that countermeasures taken in
response to an unfriendly or hostile act are the only effective means of enforcing
international environmental law).
135. BmNIE & BOYLE, supra note 132, at 110 & n.163; see, e.g., Council Direc-
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port for the polluter pays concept appeared in the Rio Decla-
ration as well.13
B. Precautionary Principle
Quite simply, the "precautionary principle" provides that
preventive measures should be taken to protect the environ-
ment in the light of uncertainty about the future consequences.
In international environmental law, it is therefore commonly
paired with the notion of "inter-generational equity," the notion
that present generations should proceed with caution in their
depletion of the world's resources, in respect of the rights of
future unborn generations.'38
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration states one version of
the precautionary principle:
[Tihe precautionary approach shall be widely applied by
States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific cer-
tainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effec-
tive measures to prevent environmental degradation."9
As with the references to "necessary" or "relevant" action in
NAFTA's Chapter Seven, some of the language in this state-
ment of the precautionary principle is frustratingly vague and
leaves room for evading action (e.g. "widely applied, cost-effec-
tive 84/631/EEC, art. 10, 1984 O.J. (L 326) 31, 35 ('In accordance with the 'pollut-
er pays' principle, the cost of implementing the [hazardous waste shipment] notifi-
cation and supervision procedure, including the necessary analyses and controls,
shall be chargeable to the holder and/or the producer of the waste by the Member
States concerned . . ").
136. It is not, however, binding on OECD member states.
137. Rio Declaration, supra note 99, Principle 16 ("National authorities should
endeavor to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of
economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should,
in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and
without distorting international trade and investment."); see also Council of Eu-
rope: Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous
to the Environment, June 21, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1228, 1230; Convention for the Pro-
tection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, Sept. 22, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 1069, 1076.
138. Lothar Gundling, What Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to the Next?
An Approach to Global Environmental Responsibility: Our Response to Future Gen-
erations, 84 AM. J. INTL L. 207, 210 (1990).
139. Rio Declaration, supra note 99, Principle 15.
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tive measures").14 Moreover, what constitutes scientific cer-
tainty can quickly become an ideological, more than an
epistomological, question.
Nonetheless, Principle 15 validates the importance of a
precautionary approach. Similar language, incorporated both
into the scientific review and risk assessment provisions of
NAFTA's Article 715 and into the Supplemental Agreement,
would go far to redirecting NAFTA into an agreement that
would promote both trade and a higher standard of health and
environmental protection for the people affected by the physi-
cal manifestations of that trade. To be sure, even a weak state-
ment of the precautionary principle" would do more to help
provide predictable consequences of NAFTA-related develop-
ment than the vague instruction of Article 715(1)(f) - namely
that a NAFTA party take into account "relevant ecological and
environmental conditions" when conducting a risk assess-
ment.
1 42
Again, there is a model for incorporating the precautionary
principle into NAFTA, and that model comes from the revi-
sions to the EEC treaty implemented by the Maastricht Trea-
ty.' Under Article 130r of the Maastrict Treaty,'44 the pre-
cautionary principle is added as an essential guide for all deci-
sions about European Community policies, rather than just as
a "component."45 It is worth adding in this context that the
European Community began as an economic association and
has gradually developed so that environmental issues are now
140. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
141. See Cameron, supra note 67, at 118 (noting wide variations in statements
of the principle, from agreement between states to act with care and foresight in
making their decisions to, "[a]t its most profound .. .dictat[ing] the institutional-
ization of precaution, which would itself entail the shifting of the burden of proof
from those opposing environmental degradation to those engaged in the challenged
activity.").
142. NAFTA, supra note 27, art. 715(1)(f).
143. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 (en-
tered into force Nov. 1, 1993) [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty].
144. Id. Article 103r(2) of the Maastricht Treaty provides, in pertinent part:
"Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection
taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the [Euro-
pean] Community. It shall be based on the precautionary principle and the princi-
ple that preventive action should be taken . . . ." Id.
145. See Philippe Sands, The "Greening" of International Law, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STuD. 293, 306 (1994).
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considered an "essential objective" of European Community
law.14
6
C. Common But Differentiated Responsibility
The last two principles I have identified for incorporation
into a revised NAFTA and a revised Supplemental Agree-
ment 47 are both subject to vast differences of interpretation
about their proper scope; how much a polluter should pay or
how much precaution is appropriate are questions that can
lead to heated disagreement. Neither of these principles, how-
ever, is likely to cause as pronounced differences of opinion as
is the principle of "common but differentiated responsibili-
ty."
14 8
The reason for the disagreement is that the principle of
common but differentiated responsibility is more boldly
redistributional in effect than the other two. However, the
principle of common but differentiated responsibility was firm-
ly endorsed at UNCED. Principle Seven of the Rio Declaration
gave the following formulation of the principle of common but
differentiated responsibility:
In view of the different contributions to global environmental
degradation, States have common but differentiated responsi-
bilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibil-
ity that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable
development in view of the pressures their societies place on
the global environment and of the technologies and financial
resources they command. 49
146. Id. (quoting Case 240/83, Procureur de la Republique 51 v. Association de
Defense des Bruleurs d'Huiles Usagees, 1985 E.C.R. 531 13).
147. Of course, one alternative would be to rework the agreements entirely, in-
corporating the supplemental environmental and labor agreements into the actual
NAFTA. On the amendment process, see supra note 27.
148. See, e.g., Andrew Jordan, Paying the Incremental Costs of Global Environ-
mental Protection: The Evolving Role of GEF, 36 ENV'T 13, 18 (1994).
149. Rio Declaration, supra note 99, Principle 7. As Philippe Sands notes,
"[slimilar language may be found in the 1992 Climate Change Convention." Sands,
supra note 145, at 308 n.52; see United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change, May 9, 1992, art. 3(1), 31 I.L.M. 849, 854. Sands describes the
principle of common but differentiated responsibility as being comprised of "two
elements. The first relates to the common responsibility of states for the protection
of the environment, or parts of it, at the national, regional, and global levels. The
second relates to the need to take account of differing circumstances, particularly
in relation to each state's contribution to the creation of a particular environmen-
tal problem and its ability to respond to, and limit and prevent, the threat."
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As one commentator has noted, this focus on shared efforts but
different contributions, which is "likely to lead increasingly to
the development and application of differing environmental
standards between and among different States," is also likely
to result in "increasingly contentious disputes between devel-
oped and developing countries on the appropriate level at
which each should set their environmental standards."' 50 The
commentator specifically cited the GATT Mexican tuna case as
an example of the difficulty of applying differential standards
in the free trade context.
As regards NAFTA, incorporation of this principle would
doubtless prove equally thorny. The reference to the burden
developed societies place on the environment by virtue of their
"technologies and financial resources" is clearly meant to indi-
cate that a developed country like the U.S. should share its
financial resources and transfer its pollution control or mini-
mizing technologies to a less developed country like Mexico.
Even assuming theoretical agreement on such a principle,
working out the practical details is no simple matter. Devel-
oped countries routinely cite legitimate proprietary concerns as
a way to fend off demands that their companies share technol-
ogy.15' However, ideas for sharing technology and insuring
that the owner is compensated to its satisfaction are being put
into practice in related contexts, and may provide useful mod-
els for trade pacts like NAFTA.' 5'
Sands, supra note 145, at 308 (emphasis in original, citations omitted).
150. Sands, supra note 145, at 308 n.54. On the GATT Mexican tuna case, see
supra note 60.
151. See supra note 74. Technology transfer is specifically mentioned in Agenda
21. See Report of the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, U.N.
GAOR, 47th Sess., Annex, Agenda 21, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev. 14,
(Part IV) (1992); Rio Declaration, supra note 99, Principle 9. Philippe Sands be-
lieves that "Agenda 21 signals the acceptance by the international community that
intellectual property rights may limit the international transfer of technologies and
thus contribute to global environmental degradation." Sands, supra note 145, at
317. Sands may, however, overstate the case. See EC Ministers Welcome Clinton's
Signing of Rio Agreements as Spur to International Progress, 16 Int'l Envtl. Rep.
(BNA) No. 9, at 346 (May 19, 1993) available in WESTLAW, BNA-IED file.
152. The Costa Rican government, for example, has begun pooling its genetic
resources in a gene bank. Central and South American genetic resources have
been for centuries the source of many critical drugs, such as quinine, which is
been derived from cinchona trees. However, these resources often have been ex-
ploited by large, foreign corporations with little return benefit to the source coun-
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Furthermore, if the twin goals of stricter environmental
protection and social stability are to be achieved, implementa-
tion of this principle would require additional safeguards. In
the context of United States/Canadian relations with Mexico,
application of this principle could have burdensome conse-
quences for Mexico, the least developed NAFTA signatory. For
instance, if the principle were articulated to require the
NAFTA signatories to accept responsibility for unusual envi-
ronmental burdens they created, Mexico might be obligated to
clean up Mexico City's notoriously polluted air. ' In the
NAFTA context, therefore, the principle of common but differ-
entiated responsibility would necessitate a provision that a
signatory be responsible for cleaning up exceptional burdens to
the extent of their financial, scientific, and technological abili-
ties. To avoid evasion of such responsibilities and to assure
try. The gene bank allows a country such as Costa Rica to classify and character-
ize the local flora and fauna, often with the financial and scientific support of
foreign corporations. Companies hoping to develop a new drug will send a request
for a substance with certain characteristics to the gene bank, which will then
return samples to the company. Payment for the gene resource can be either mon-
etary or in the form of additional employee training or equipment provided to the
bank. See Michael D. Coughlin, Jr., Using the Merek-INBio Agreement to Clarify
the Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 COLUm. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 337 (1993).
The Convention on Biological Diversity also recognizes that intellectual prop-
erty rights need to be protected before related technology is transferred. See Con-
vention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, art. 1, 31 I.L.M. 818, 823 (not in
force) (Identifying the goals of "the conservation of biological diversity, the sustain-
able use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits aris-
ing out of the use of genetic resources.").
153. In Mexico City alone, health care costs associated with air pollution have
been estimated at $1.5 billion a year. World Bank Turns From Saving Trees to
Saving Cities, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Sept. 27, 1994, at R13. For a description
of the city's problems see also Where the Air Was Clear, BUS. MEX., Aug. 1994, at
36, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
Many developing nations like Mexico have argued that they cannot afford
the cost of implementing stricter environmental standards and should not be ex-
pected to introduce them without assistance or until they achieve economic pros-
perity comparable to that of more developed nations like the U.S. See, e.g., UNIT-
ED NATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ONE EARTH, MANY
NATIONS 16 (1990) (In the context of carbon dioxide emissions the author stated,
inter alia, that "some 80 percent of the annual increase in atmospheric carbon
dioxide comes from the industrialized countries, which have put the entire planet
at risk with their environmental recklessness over the past century; it is the coun-
tries that have grown rich polluting the atmosphere that must cut their emissions,
not the poor."); Ranee Khooshie Lal Panjabi, Can International Law Improve the
Climate? An Analysis of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change Signed at the Rio Summit in 1992, 18 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COMm. REG.
491, 517 (1993).
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equitable burden sharing, new treaty language would ideally
clarify the specific extent of a party's obligations. There is, in
fact, international treaty language that provides models for
and would support such an approach."" If the goal is to allo-
cate responsibility equally for environmental protection and
cleanup, in view not only of the fact that pollution observes no
boundaries but also, as recent international events have so
powerfully reminded us, because political unrest observes no
frontiers, this approach is essential to the smooth future opera-
tion of NAFTA.
IV. CONCLUSION
It would be absurd to suggest that failure to incorporate
the principles discussed in this Article into NAFTA and its
Supplemental Agreement will result in widespread social un-
rest in either Mexico or the U.S., at least in the short term.
However, as the recent Cuban exodus reminds us, the poten-
tial for unrest on our borders-an unfamiliar notion to most
U.S. citizens-is a very real one. Failure to attend to a number
of cross-national interactions, including environmental protec-
tion by U.S. companies in Mexico, could possibly lead to anoth-
er such disruption, one that could be costly in human and
economic terms. The Chiapas rebellion clearly shows that the
symbolic and real effects of NAFTA will be with us for genera-
tions. It behooves us, therefore, to take every possible step to
insure smooth social relations within and among the states
that signed NAFTA. Reconsideration and reformulation of
NAFTA's weak environmental provisions is one way to help
secure this goal, and cannot commence too quickly.
154. Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution,
Feb. 16, 1976, art. 11(3), 15 I.L.M. 290, 292; Convention on the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping Wastes and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, art. II,
1046 U.N.T.S. 120 (entered into force Aug. 30, 1975).
In a directly relevant example, the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, art. 5(1), 26 I.L.M. 1541, 1555 (en-
tered into force Jan 1, 1989), permits developing countries to delay compliance
with ozone depletion control measures if they meet certain requirements, namely
that they have an annual calculated consumption of a substance controlled by the
protocol of less than 0.3 kg. per capita, on the date the protocol entered into force,
or any time thereafter until January 1, 1999. See also United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 LL.M. 849; United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 207, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1310.
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